By Avi Tyagi
The Mavs have cratered. Following the official pronouncement of Kyrie’s injury status and the announcements of uncertain return timelines for Anthony Davis, Dereck Lively, and Daniel Gafford, the Dallas Mavericks have nowhere left to turn. 9 months ago, Mavs fans were prepared for a long runway of success. It’s all gone wrong since then. And while the shortsighted and foolhardy Luka and Quentin Grimes trades have been key factors, I think 1 move in the offseason truly exemplified the start of this new era. The Mavericks’ addition of Klay was the first example of this desperate, win-now attitude and its ramifications changed the scope of what was possible for Dallas in the future. While acquiring Grimes and Naji Marshall were savvy, low-cost moves to improve their bench production, the route the Mavericks chose to fill their starting small forward hole was fraught with concern from the start. If you’re (still) a Mavericks fan, I feel for you and would implore you to avert your eyes. It’s a tough read.
In 2022, upon his return, Klay was shot-happy, but offered more as a playmaker within the flow of the offense. He was in great shape for the most part, having spent so long rehabbing to prepare for a playoff run. Defensively, his days of being a primary POA defender were over, but in a disciplined team scheme, Klay fit in just fine. A very solid playoff run capped off with his 4th championship. It was a crowning achievement for a man who’d worked so hard mentally and physically to find his way back. With exhaustion and celebration sapping his mental energy, the 2022 offseason didn’t set Klay up for the 2023 season. In that summer, Klay scrimmaged minimally due to worries about another injury after so much rehab and exertion through the playoffs. It was a choice driven by fear for a player who also harbored All-Star ambitions. He played himself into shape for the first two months of the 2022-23 season. It was quite ugly at times, but around Christmas, Klay started finding a groove. At the turn of the calendar, Klay finally reached the heights he desired. He had enough spring in his step to launch movement shots without swaying at high volume over the course of a game and, crucially, he regained the confidence, burst, and familiar timing he needed to attack the rim. In the first game of 2023, Klay finished with 54 points on only 39 shots and 2 free throws against Atlanta. He made 5 out of 6 layups and attempted 9 drives. It was the most shots he’d ever taken in a game and on a day without Steph, Wiggins, and Kuminga, they needed every single shot. The Dubs won by 2 in a double overtime extravaganza and Klay didn’t look back. He averaged 23.9 points per game from New Year’s till the end of the regular season on 60.3% true shooting. The Warriors rightfully never demanded Klay to fill the same defensive role he’d previously held but, offensively, this stretch run was a return to peak Klay. It was some true borderline All-Star-caliber play. The good vibes continued into the playoffs until the Lakers’ series.
Under the intense scrutiny of a Laker defense unwilling to allow shots within the arc and the looming paint presence of Anthony Davis, Klay couldn’t hold up. The Lakers would often put 2 on the ball to force Steph’s teammates into action and would pre-switch to allow AD the room to clog up the paint. The Looney-Draymond spacing didn’t help the cause and Poole’s sharp decline from their championship season and lack of enthusiasm at times soured the mood. Klay shot 10 of 36 within the arc and attempted 6 free throws in 6 games. Perhaps he was just mentally and physically exhausted from rebuilding his offensive attack since his first injury in 2019. Perhaps he was just exhausted from finally achieving that goal in January 2023 and then attempting to carry that load for several months on end. Whatever the case may be, Klay just couldn’t generate the necessary separation or defend against quicker matchups in any capacity against the Lakers. Perhaps driven by that series or just general fatigue mixed with pressure inflicted upon himself, Klay appeared washed the following season. He just couldn’t score within 16 feet of the hoop anymore or drive enough to pressure a defense. His pull-up 3 rate dropped as he struggled to find the deceleration required to get a shot off. Even on the glass, despite playing more minutes at power forward, Klay couldn’t even rebound at the same rate as before. In combination with his own unhappiness at his general caliber of play and a shifting role with young talent ready to break through, it was time for Klay to go. Dallas signed this version of Klay, viewing him as a final piece of the puzzle. It appeared curious as a description anyway. A player who seemed fully washed and past even his mini-return to prime form, was now going to an offense with fewer movement shooting opportunities to be a 3-and-D forward matched up even more frequently against opposing 3s and 4s. It’s gone about as expected.
Klay hasn’t been bad, but he hasn’t been the addition needed to aim for a championship. He’d be a good piece as a 3rd or 4th forward, but Dallas paid him starting caliber money in his age-34 season on a 3-year deal. Even before the Luka trade, the Mavericks were already in trouble. Luka, Kyrie, and their centers had been brilliant, but the rest of the roster. P.J. had been fine. Naji, fine. Dinwiddie, fine. Grimes, fine. Hardy and OMP, are subpar. That’s a problem for a roster where almost every core player is either in their prime or somewhat post-prime. Now maybe that’s good enough to make you a competitor for a playoff series win in the West, but a young OKC had improved significantly from their 1-seeded roster from the year prior and Memphis and Houston had risen like phoenixes to the top of the conference. Houston, in particular, as young athletic upstarts, presented itself as more than capable of mucking up a heliocentric Luka offense. Amen and Tari, with a well-orchestrated defense around them and Ime in charge, were already the sort of foil that would concern Dallas. On top of that, the acquisition of Klay hard-capped the Mavs at the first apron, since it technically was a sign & trade. And then, on top of all the red flags, they just decided to trade Luka and Grimes for a needle-in-the-haystack shot at the title. Within weeks, everyone got hurt and now this team is down to playing its two-ways for a few more games of eligibility with only 7-9 players eligible and active on any given day. The prioritization of Max Christie over Grimes and the desire to add Caleb Martin shine another light on the systematic issues that have crushed this roster.
When you trade Luka for AD, you naturally create a large vacuum in perimeter shot creation. A healthy Kyrie can fulfill many of those responsibilities, but there’s still a massive void and Kyrie is often hurt. Trading Grimes for Caleb Martin was not just faith in Max Christie, but in Klay as well. Quentin Grimes in 12 starts for the Mavs had averaged just over 14 a night on superb efficiency (49% from the floor, 40 from 3, 63% TS%), and had a prospect history as a 5-star combo guard who found his way as a shot creator at Houston. Christie has never shown that ability at the college level, much less in the league. Grimes is shiftier and has the better first step and footspeed required to generate shots at the rim. The younger Christie might be the better defender and was already locked into a reasonable contract structure, but trading Grimes for Caleb Martin is and was hasty. Caleb Martin was a limited bench player for Miami until their 2022-23 underdog 8th seed. Caleb’s playoff run was a breakout moment in the national spotlight, where he shredded the nets as a bench spark plug for 20+ games, especially against Miami and Boston. Of course, that also conveniently ignores the fact that part of the reason Miami was an 8 seed was because they had to start Caleb Martin for parts of that season. Even in the playoffs, Miami turned to Vincent, Strus, and Kevin Love as supporting starters around the superstar future HOFer Jimmy and a burgeoning Bam. Those 3 provided a mix of quality shooting with secondary playmaking that Caleb didn’t. Therefore, Caleb had a simplified role throughout the playoffs that he excelled in. It’s also the only stretch of his career that we’ve seen that kind of shooting from Caleb. He’s otherwise an average to below-average stationary shooter and solid wing defender who won’t turn the ball over but doesn’t tend to shine when asked to make passing reads with a live dribble or create offense for himself. If that reads like a big-wing version of Max Christie, that’s what he is. Nico put all the pressure on Kyrie and Dinwiddie to carry offensive creation for this roster and left them with nowhere else to turn to if injury struck. The Kyrie injury is the culmination of a sad, flawed, failed process for Dallas.
It’s hard for me to point to this roster and find any true hope. Kyrie seems likely to miss most, if not all, of next season. AD just turned 32 and might be shut down for the season if the losses continue to pile up. Exum’s broken hand early into a 40-point beatdown loss at the hands of the Rockets further emphasized the despair for the most injured team in the league. Gone are aspirations for a second consecutive Finals appearance or even a playoff series victory. The tank is on. Perhaps most concerningly, Max Christie and Lively are their only core pieces under the age of 25. By 2026-27, the first full year we might expect Kyrie to be back, Klay will be 36 with a 17-mill-per-year deal, and their cap space is still likely to be limited. Hardy seems like a likely trade candidate by then, PJ and Gafford might be on extensions (or traded), but on the whole it’s hard to find many avenues for improvement. This team desperately needs to luck into a top-4 pick this year. Even with Portland and Phoenix having demanding schedules, Dallas can easily tank their way into a top-10 pick. San Antonio and Chicago are likely to be a bridge too far, but it’s still conceivable. With the 10th-worst record, Dallas would have a 13.9% chance at a top-4 pick. Even if the Mavs only land the 10th pick, they might profit greatly. The 2025 class starts strong and remains pretty deep through the lottery before a drop-off occurs. This is where Dallas is. Maybe they fully commit now to an offseason rebuild and commit to opening up cap space to entice a young star to join in 2027, but even that’s a reach at this stage. Plenty of other teams have already pointed their rosters toward a 2027 timeline, with better assets and younger players. It’s a stunning fall from grace, but Dallas set the tone in the offseason with their acquisition of Klay and the rhetoric around it. Once they traded Luka and Grimes away, this was the endgame they had set themselves up for.
